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I. Introduction 
I’m honored to have the opportunity to reflect on my over 
thirty years at Washington and Lee and to explain and evaluate 
the scholarly work that Professor Lyman Johnson and I have done 
here. In this Essay, I will focus on three topics. First, I will offer a 
few words about the beginnings of our collaborative work. We 
embarked on our scholarly careers in the later 1980s, a time of 
great turmoil in the corporate law arena brought about by the 
hostile takeover phenomenon and its social costs. Although we 
came to this problem from quite different political perspectives, we 
                                                                                                     
 * J.B. Stombock Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am 
grateful to the organizers of this Symposium for all the work that went into 
making it such a success. Thanks also to my friends and colleagues Christopher 
Bruner and Lyman Johnson for their thoughts on an earlier version of this Essay 
and to the Frances Lewis Law Center for its financial support. 
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shared a determination to challenge the then-orthodox view that 
the primary objective of corporate law was and should be 
shareholder wealth maximization. We termed this the 
“shareholder primacy” conception of corporate purpose.1 In Part III 
of this Essay, I will address in detail what I take to be the status 
of shareholder primacy today.2 I will close with some thoughts 
about the impact that we may have had both within and beyond 
the academy. 
II. Shareholder Primacy and Hostile Takeovers 
I arrived at Washington and Lee in 1986. This was my first 
teaching job after three years at a large Boston law firm, where I 
had been an associate in the litigation department. I spent most of 
my time there on large corporate and commercial cases, doing my 
part at the bottom of the staffing hierarchies. This mostly meant 
discovery, and most of that was utterly tedious document 
production. There were also research memorandums and some 
brief-writing, and occasional second-chairs at depositions, but I 
never did participate in an actual trial because the big cases almost 
never went to trial. 
Because of my experience at the law firm, limited though it 
was, I thought I would be best suited to teaching civil procedure 
and evidence. My scholarly interests were elsewhere. I had a Ph.D. 
in medieval English legal history and expected to continue to work 
in that area, but I was also drawn to legal issues of more 
contemporary importance. 
I was particularly interested in antitrust law because of the 
important political questions it addressed. In those days, debates 
still raged over the basic goals of the antitrust laws. There was a 
strong tradition that saw the law’s principal goal as controlling the 
economic and political power of gigantic corporations.3 Against this 
                                                                                                     
 1. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 223 n.2 
(1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law] (coining the term 
“shareholder primacy”).  
 2. Infra Part III.  
 3. See, e.g., Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons from Competition Law From 
the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the 
“Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 266 (2011) 
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older notion were new ideas promoted mainly at the University of 
Chicago.4 According to this view, the antitrust laws should not be 
concerned with big business as such.5 Monopoly could be efficient 
and therefore beneficial to consumers.6 Loss of less-efficient 
smaller businesses therefore was not a bad thing, even though that 
meant loss of economic opportunity for their owners.7 For me, this 
debate raised important political questions about economic power 
and social justice in the context of the structure of our nation’s 
economy. As a result, my first major article, published in 1988,8 
was about the history of the Sherman Act,9 the principal antitrust 
statute. I argued that the statute reflected nineteenth-century 
ideas that valued decentralized, balanced economic power and 
were hostile to concentrated power regardless of potential 
efficiency benefits.10 
In addition to the course on antitrust law, I ended up being 
assigned to the business organizations course instead of civil 
procedure or evidence. It did not occur to me that I would end up 
writing about corporate law because I didn’t think it would be of 
interest to me. The big questions then revolved around the balance 
of power between shareholders and management and how that 
balance might be adjusted to achieve better financial returns for 
investors. Larger issues of social or economic justice were generally 
ignored. Professor Victor Brudney, my law school corporate law 
                                                                                                     
(“[A]ntitrust law in an earlier era was concerned about the threat of harm out-
sized enterprise posed to others by its sheer power . . . .”).  
 4. See Millon, infra note 8, at 1221 (discussing antitrust law as emphasizing 
“the maximization of aggregate consumer welfare, defined as optimal satisfaction 
of consumer preferences” (citing Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 
127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979))).  
 5. See id. (“The second element [of the Chicago School] emphasizes that 
maximization can only occur if antitrust law is interpreted and applied without 
regard for other values that conflict with the efficiency norm.”). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1219 (1988). This article had its origins in a paper I wrote as a third-year 
law student under the direction of Professor Morton Horwitz. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 10. My article was in part a refutation of then-Professor Robert Bork’s claim 
that the Sherman Act’s legislative history reflected the Chicago School’s efficiency 
agenda. Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. 
& ECON. 7 (1966). 
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professor, acknowledged as much when I ran into him at a 
conference shortly after I entered law teaching. I expressed to him 
my misgivings about corporate law as an academic field. He 
responded, “Yes, the struggle between the common and the 
preferred shareholders is not the class struggle.” For those 
interested in political economy and social justice, academic 
corporate law in the early 1980s evidently was not the place to be.11 
But all that was changing when I arrived at Washington and 
Lee. The hostile takeover boom was in full swing.12 For me, this 
ended up meaning that corporate law could be far more interesting 
than I had thought coming out of law school. 
Hostile takeovers fractured long-standing assumptions about 
managerial autonomy and shareholder passivity in a two-party 
corporate governance universe.13 Corporations and specialized 
buy-out groups were using borrowed capital to buy controlling 
blocks of stock in companies whose shares were undervalued.14 The 
tender offer device allowed those seeking control to appeal directly 
to the target company’s shareholders by offering them a large 
premium over the market price of their shares.15 Raiders able to 
acquire a controlling block of shares could then put in a new 
management team dedicated to trimming waste and managerial 
slack, divesting the corporation of underperforming divisions and 
subsidiaries, and cutting expenses even where they might promise 
long-term gains.16 If successful in these efforts, the new owner of 
the target corporation’s stock would realize a potentially large 
increase in the value of its shareholding.  
What was compelling about all this to Professor Johnson and 
me was the fact that hostile takeovers presented a stark tradeoff 
between the interests of shareholders on the one hand and those of 
                                                                                                     
 11. To be sure, there were plenty critics of corporate power, but they 
generally were not corporate law academics. See generally, e.g., RALPH NADER ET 
AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION: HOW THE LARGEST CORPORATIONS CONTROL 
OUR LIVES (1977). 
 12. Dale Arthur Oesterle, Method to the Merger Madness: Revisiting the ‘80s 
Takeover Boom, REGULATION, Spring 1997, at 27. 
 13.  See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. 
LAW. 101, 102 (1979) (discussing whether directors must accept any takeover bid 
“that represents a substantial premium over the current market [price]”).  
 14. Id. at 104.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Oesterle, supra note 12, at 27.  
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nonshareholders—especially workers—on the other. For 
shareholders, a tender offer presenting a big premium over market 
price meant quick and easy profit.17 And shareholders stood to gain 
even if their company was not the target of a hostile tender offer 
because all managers had an incentive to boost share prices in 
order to deter raiders looking to profit from acquisition of 
underperforming companies.18 
But these gains for shareholders often came at the expense of 
nonshareholders.19 Post-takeover corporate management cut costs 
wherever possible because it had to pay down the enormous debt 
assumed to finance the acquisition.20 This could mean plant 
closings and lay-offs, and elimination of discretionary expenditures 
like research and development or marketing. It could also mean an 
end to investments in nonshareholder wellbeing such as job 
training or health and safety programs justified by the 
corporation’s long-term sustainability.  
Lawyers quickly developed legal tactics that allowed corporate 
management to resist unwelcome tender offers.21 Most notable, of 
course, was the poison pill.22 These and other antitakeover devices 
had the effect of blocking acquisition efforts not sanctioned in 
advance by target company management. Predictably, target 
company shareholders and hostile bidders challenged these 
antitakeover defenses in state courts, most importantly 
                                                                                                     
 17.  See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 1, at 224 n.3 
(“Premiums paid to shareholders in hostile tender offers have averaged 50% over 
market price.”). 
 18. See id. at 234 (“The looming threat of a hostile takeover spurs corporate 
managers to eliminate slack and otherwise increase corporate profitability . . . .”). 
 19. See id. at 225 (arguing that “relentless pursuit of profit maximization for 
[shareholders’] sake can impose substantial costs on nonshareholders”).  
 20. See id. at 234 (“The use of enormous amounts of credit to finance these 
acquisitions creates strong pressures to cut costs, and, in some cases, prompts 
asset liquidations and plant closings.” (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders 
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–7 
(1986))).  
 21. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 
1165–82 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management]. 
 22. See Suzanne S. Dawson, Robert J. Pence & David S. Stone, Poison Pill 
Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 424 (1987) (describing the use and 
different methods of poison pill tactics . . . .”). 
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Delaware’s.23 The stakes now being so high, judges found 
themselves compelled to revisit older rulings that had accorded 
broad (though not unlimited) business judgment rule deference to 
target company management seeking to resist a hostile takeover.24 
Now, they were required to side either with target company 
management and nonshareholders by allowing defensive 
measures or, instead, with target company shareholders and 
hostile bidders by striking down defensive measures and 
mandating that target company management remain neutral and 
allow shareholders to decide for themselves whether to accept a 
tender offer. 
Advocates for shareholders saw the problem in terms of 
shareholder property rights and freedom of contract. Stock was the 
shareholders’ property and they ought to be able to decide when to 
sell or not. The Delaware courts—wisely, in our view—chose a 
different perspective, characterizing the problem as a question of 
“where the power of corporate governance lies.”25 Allowing target 
company shareholders freedom to decide whether to accept a 
tender offer would in effect give them the power to decide the 
corporation’s future, because a successful tender offer would result 
in new management and potentially big changes necessary to 
make the acquisition profitable to the raider.26 Viewing the 
problem in terms of corporate governance, it was not surprising 
that the Delaware Supreme Court came down on the side of 
management’s power to block hostile takeovers in order to preserve 
its authority to determine the corporation’s future.27 This 
conclusion was entirely consistent with the foundational principle 
of Delaware corporate law that management, not the shareholders, 
                                                                                                     
 23. See generally, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 24. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556–57 (Del. 1964) (applying  the 
business judgment rule to determine whether directors should be liable for injury 
to shareholders for resisting a hostile takeover).  
 25. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154. 
 26.  See id. at 1149–50 (“Did Time’s board, having developed a strategic plan 
of global expansion to be launched through a business combination with Warner, 
come under a fiduciary duty to jettison its plan and put the corporation’s future 
in the hands of its shareholders?”). 
 27. Id. at 1154–55. 
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governs the corporation and decides its future.28 The Delaware 
judges went further and also rejected the argument that 
management ought to be required to use its governance authority 
solely to promote shareholder financial interests.29 Instead, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that management’s duty to “the 
corporate enterprise” included the power to take nonshareholder 
interests into account when faced with a hostile tender offer.30 A 
duty to prioritize shareholder interests over those of 
nonshareholders was said to arise only in narrowly defined 
circumstances that could only occur if a target’s management chose 
voluntarily to enter into a transaction that triggered that duty.31 
Soon after Professor Johnson and I arrived at W&L, we 
realized that we shared the same perspective on the takeover 
phenomenon and on the larger question of the social costs of a legal 
regime of shareholder primacy. But we came to this perspective 
from very different directions. My politics are pretty far to the left 
and I have always voted as a Democrat. A legal regime that 
emphasized shareholder wealth maximization at the expense of 
other corporate stakeholders made no sense to me. Workers in 
                                                                                                     
 28. See id. at 1154 (“Delaware law confers the management of the corporate 
enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected representatives . . . . That duty may 
not be delegated to the stockholders.” (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) 
(2016))). 
 29. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–58 (Del. 
1985) (ruling that management may consider factors other than a shareholder’s 
financial interest in determining whether to accept a hostile takeover bid).  
 30. See id. at 955 (noting that directors may take into consideration the 
“impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders” when entertaining a hostile 
takeover bid). 
 31.  In Revlon (and in subsequent decisions clarifying the Revlon holding), 
the court held that management’s duty was to obtain the best price available for 
its shareholders, regardless of nonshareholder considerations, when (i) break-up 
of the company becomes inevitable because management has initiated an auction 
of the company or has chosen to enter into a transaction that will have that result, 
or (ii) management enters into a transaction that will result in a change of control. 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1985); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 
1994); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 (Del. 
1989). Absent these conditions, management’s duty—at least in the takeover 
context—to prioritize shareholder interests over those of nonshareholders does 
not apply. And, even within Revlon’s narrow sphere, either triggering situation 
depends on a voluntary choice made by the company’s management. In that 
important sense, Revlon’s pro-shareholder rule is optional. 
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particular lacked the bargaining power to protect their own 
interests by means of contract.  
Professor Johnson, in contrast, is a conservative, though not 
of the stripe that is ascendant today. Values like community, 
stability, institutional self-reform, and regard for others animate 
his opposition to policies that valorize shareholder wealth 
maximization and leave affected nonshareholders to fend for 
themselves. Professor Johnson’s religious commitment also led 
him to reject arguments based solely on so-called free-market 
economics. So, odd as it might seem to those who don’t know us 
well, we were both drawn to the dramatic policy challenges 
presented by hostile takeovers, and it was an easy alliance from 
the start. 
The genesis of our first co-authored article was an invitation 
from Professor Johnson and his wife to their home in Rockbridge 
County not long after I arrived at Washington and Lee. At the 
time, there was talk about whether the federal Williams Act32 
preempted state legislation restricting takeover activity. Professor 
Johnson asked whether, if that were the case, federal law would 
also preempt state common law doctrines that allowed corporate 
management to block hostile tender offers. When we looked into 
the question of preemption of state common law (as opposed to 
state statutes), we found that indeed the answer was yes.33 So we 
offered a challenge to preemption advocates: Did they really intend 
their arguments to go this far? 
Soon after that, we looked deeper into the preemption 
argument and found it was wrong both as to state statutes and to 
common law. In another co-authored article, we examined the 
Williams Act’s legislative history and concluded that the United 
States Congress did not intend to take a position pro or contra on 
the desirability of hostile takeovers.34 That policy question was 
assumed to be for the several states to decide for themselves. 
                                                                                                     
 32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f) (2012). 
 33. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Does the Williams Act 
Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989). 
 34. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams 
Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989) (reprinted in 33 CORPORATE PRACTICE 
COMMENTATOR 221 (1991)). Arguments about legislative intent often mistakenly 
conflate the legislature’s assumption about the existence of a particular social 
phenomenon with an intention to shore up or encourage that phenomenon.  
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In addition to this Article, we wrote several more—some 
written together,35 some individually36—about the problem of 
shareholder primacy in the hostile takeover context. Professor 
Johnson and I sought to illuminate the judicial and legislative 
rejection of an approach to takeover regulation that would have 
prioritized shareholder interests over those of nonshareholders. As 
we explained in one of our articles,37 shareholder primacy in the 
                                                                                                     
 35. For examples of our co-authored articles, see generally Lyman Johnson 
& David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 846 (1989) (reprinted in 31 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 581 (1990)); Lyman 
Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 BUS. LAW. 2105 (1990); 
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law: Who’s 
in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177 (1993). 
 36. For examples of articles that we wrote individually, see generally Millon, 
Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 1; David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A 
Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988) [hereinafter 
Millon, State Takeover Laws]; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). See also Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and 
Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1986); Lyman 
Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992); Lyman Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a 
Skeptical World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (1992) (reprinted in 34 CORP. PRAC. 
COMMENTATOR 367 (1992)); Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, 
16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485 (1991) [hereinafter Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate 
Stock]; Lyman Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, Community, 
and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051 (1988); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware 
Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 
865 (1990) [hereinafter Johnson, Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of 
Corporate Life and Corporate Law]; Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between 
Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 
35 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson, The Eventual Clash]. 
 37. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 34, at 1882–
86. The term “shareholder primacy” first appears in the law reviews in early 1989, 
in articles published by Professor Johnson and myself. Millon, State Takeover 
Laws, supra note 36, at 904; Johnson, The Eventual Clash, supra note 36, at 76–
86 (outlining the differences in the approaches of legislatures and the courts). The 
term has gone on to achieve broad currency in the corporate law academy, both 
in this country and abroad. See generally Malcolm Anderson et al., Shareholder 
Primacy and Directors’ Duties: An Australian Perspective, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 161 
(2008) (Austl.); Paul Krüger Andersen & Evelyne J. B. Sørensen, The Principle of 
Shareholder Primacy in Company Law from a Nordic and European Regulatory 
Perspective, in THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION (Hanne 
Birkmose, Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig Sørensen eds., 2011) (Neth.); John 
Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and the 
Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531 (2003) (U.K.); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence 
Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45 (2002); Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 
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hostile takeover context had two aspects. It expressed the view 
that shareholder interests should take precedence over those of 
managers, workers, and other nonshareholders. Seen this way, 
there is no necessary implication of shareholder governance 
authority; management could be charged with the responsibility to 
protect shareholder interests.38 This could mean the power to block 
a hostile bid deemed not to be in the shareholders’ financial 
interest.39 Shareholder primacy could also suggest, though, that 
shareholders ought to have the power to protect their own 
interests.40 In the hostile takeover context, this would mean the 
power to decide for themselves whether to accept or reject takeover 
bids, even if that had the effect of determining the future of the 
corporation.41  
Neither notion of shareholder primacy got much traction in 
the business community, whose leaders favored stability and the 
power of corporate managers to do their jobs without external 
interference. State legislators also rejected shareholder primacy 
for political reasons, being more responsive to local labor and 
business interests—both well organized—than to shareholders 
living elsewhere and lacking effective lobbying operations. Real 
economic hardship for local citizens also trumped abstract ideas 
like economic efficiency or freedom of contract. Over forty states 
(but not Delaware) therefore enacted statutes that expressly 
authorize management to take nonshareholder interests into 
account, even at the expense of shareholders.42 And, as noted 
                                                                                                     
55 SMU L. REV. 141 (2002); Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of 
Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909 (2013); Paddy Ireland, 
Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV. 49 (2005) 
(U.K.); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 
(1998) [hereinafter Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm]; Lynn A. Stout, Bad 
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 
(2002). For elaboration on the meaning of shareholder primacy without special 
reference to the takeover context, see David Millon, Radical Shareholder 
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, Radical 
Shareholder Primacy]. 
 38. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 34, at 1882. 
 39. See id. at 1883 (explaining that management “may go so far as to 
thwart a takeover bid—denying shareholders any opportunity to tender—where 
deemed necessary to ‘protect’ shareholder interest”). 
 40. Id. at 1885. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 1, at 225–27 (noting 
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above, Delaware’s judicial response to takeover defenses denied 
shareholders the power to decide the corporation's future and 
rejected the idea (except in the very narrow Revlon context) that 
management’s sole duty was to maximize shareholder wealth.43 
In the takeover context, shareholder primacy’s stronghold was 
in academia. A shareholder primacy approach to this problem 
would have required management to favor shareholders over 
nonshareholders by abstaining from interference with access to 
takeover premia. This was the view advocated by several corporate 
law scholars at leading law schools.44 Seen this way, the central 
questions for corporate law were the balance of power between 
management and shareholders and the optimal mix of legal 
intervention versus market-based pressures in regulating that 
balance. The underlying assumption that shareholder interests 
should take precedence over those of other corporate stakeholders 
was taken for granted. 
Shareholder primacy’s rejection in the broader society was 
pretty uncontroversial and would have happened without 
Professor Johnson’s and my scholarly efforts. We do like to think, 
though, that our work encouraged other law professors to question 
or even reject shareholder primacy at a time when doing so 
undoubtedly brought with it significant career advancement costs. 
Maybe it was easier to swim upstream in the company of others 
than it would have been to do so alone. This group was labeled 
“communitarians.” I don’t know where this came from. We didn't 
devise the name ourselves, and it may have been intended 
derisively, but we didn't mind, and the term offered a convenient 
counterpart to the so-called “contractarian,” shareholder primacy 
mainstream. 
                                                                                                     
the enactment of these new statutes). See generally Katherine Hale, Note, 
Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 823 (2003) [hereinafter Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders] (collecting 
and commenting on the new legislation). 
 43. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
Delaware courts took a more management-oriented view of corporate 
governance). 
 44. In the context of takeover defenses, the leading articles were Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) and Ronald J. Gilson, 
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in 
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981). 
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III. Shareholder Primacy Today 
Since those early years, when our focus was primarily on 
hostile takeovers, Professor Johnson and I have continued to argue 
against shareholder primacy, both as a description of the law as it 
is and also on normative grounds.45  
From a normative perspective, shareholder primacy can have 
harmful effects on society.46 Business policies designed to 
maximize profits can lead to illegal or reckless conduct, as in the 
cases of General Motors or BP, for example.47 Even when 
corporations act within the law, obsession with profit 
maximization can result in harm to the environment, human 
rights violations in developing countries, or elaborate tax 
avoidance schemes.48 Further, corporations need to have the 
discretion to invest in nonshareholder well-being, even where that 
involves short-term cost and the long-run financial benefits are 
uncertain and hard to quantify. For example, companies may want 
to spend money on employee “wellness” in order to enhance loyalty 
and productivity and thereby generate long-run value of an 
uncertain magnitude. 
I agree with those who argue that legislation mandating 
socially responsible behavior would be a first-best solution, but 
there is essentially zero chance of that happening any time soon. 
For that reason, the law should at least give corporate 
management the freedom to voluntarily attend to social 
considerations even if that means less money for shareholders. 
My own recent work has focused on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Because a CSR conception of management’s 
                                                                                                     
 45. Some of my work has been entirely unrelated to corporate law. See, e.g., 
DAVID MILLON, SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES FROM THE KING’S COURTS 1272–
1307 (2009) (documenting medieval ecclesiastical cases bearing on conflicts of 
jurisdiction between church and royal courts); David Millon, Juries, Judges, and 
Democracy, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 135 (1993) (discussing SHANNON STIMSON, THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE 
JOHN MARSHALL (1990)); David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 (1992) (considering how legal interpretation can be made more 
democratic). 
 46. Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, supra note 36, at 553. 
 47. David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1373, 1378 (1993). 
 48. Id. 
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function would authorize consideration of nonshareholder as well 
as shareholder well-being, I frame CSR as an alternative to 
shareholder primacy. The importance of CSR, in my view, is the 
potential for management of multinational enterprises to reject 
policies and practices—sometimes but not always legal—that 
enrich shareholders but harm the environment and violate human 
rights. I have considered the CSR alternative to shareholder 
primacy from three angles. First is the question of whether U.S. 
corporate law—especially Delaware—allows corporate 
management to deviate from shareholder wealth maximization in 
order to pursue environmental rights, human rights, and other 
values. Second, I have examined alternative conceptions of CSR, 
distinguishing between policies based purely on ethical 
considerations and those that have the potential to enhance 
corporate profits and long-run survival. Finally, I have written 
about the non-legal pressures that discourage voluntary adoption 
of CSR policies. I consider each of these issues in the remainder of 
this Part. 
A. Shareholder Primacy and Contemporary Corporate Law 
With respect to what the law is now, I and others (including 
Professors Johnson49 and Bruner50) think corporate law—
including Delaware’s—already gives management the freedom to 
deviate from profit maximization where necessary to promote 
business policies responsive to social considerations.51 The law is, 
                                                                                                     
 49. See generally Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate 
Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (2013); 
Johnson, Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate 
Law, supra note 36. 
 50. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of 
Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008). 
 51. This was the main point of our recent article on the Supreme Court’s 
controversial Burwell v. Hobby Lobby decision. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, 
Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson & 
Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby]. We did not take a position on the 
broader question of the desirability of exempting corporations from Obamacare 
(or other federal mandates) on religious grounds. Rather, we looked at the 
decision from the perspective of state corporate law. Id. at 1. Our central point 
was that the majority’s understanding of state corporate law (despite its 
somewhat opaque and incoherent exposition) as permitting incorporators to 
define business purpose in ways other than profit maximization is correct. Id. at 
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in our view, essentially agnostic on the question of corporate 
purpose. It accords broad discretion to the corporation’s board and 
senior management to decide how zealously the company should 
pursue profit, when it should voluntarily undertake strategies or 
projects that do not have profit maximization as their primary 
objective, and when long-term gains should be preferred over 
short-term ones.52  
With respect to existing law, it should first be noted that 
Delaware’s corporation statute53 nowhere mandates that 
corporations must be managed so as to maximize shareholder 
wealth. Nor, despite frequent statements to the contrary, does it 
refer to Delaware business corporations as “for-profit” entities. 
Instead, the statute states expressly that “[a] corporation may be 
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote 
any lawful business or purposes.”54 
Only a few Delaware cases address the question of corporate 
purpose. One recent trial court opinion speaks of shareholder 
wealth maximization as a statutory mandate, despite the absence 
of statutory language to that effect.55 The case turned on the 
question of whether the founders of craigslist, a corporation formed 
pursuant to the Delaware business corporation statute, were free 
to define the purpose of the business as something other than profit 
maximization.56 The three founders of the company chose 
deliberately, as a community service, to provide potentially 
lucrative publication of classified advertising free of charge to the 
advertisers.57 One of the three founders later sold his minority 
                                                                                                     
20–23. 
 52. Despite the absence of a shareholder primacy legal mandate, there is no 
real doubt that management will pursue profitable business strategies because 
there are plenty of market-based incentives to do so, including the need to raise 
capital in a competitive market, executive compensation arrangements that 
reward financial performance, and the need for the company’s long-run survival 
in competitive product and service markets. The absence of a legal maximization 
requirement does not, in other words, present a serious threat that corporations 
will disregard profit-seeking in a substantial way. It does mean, though, that they 
are free to do so in response to competing considerations. 
 53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-15 (2011). 
 54. Id. § 101(b). 
 55. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 7–8. 
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interest to eBay, which of course purchased those shares with 
knowledge that craigslist did not seek to maximize financial 
return.58 eBay’s objective was eventually to acquire control of 
craigslist and reorient its business model so as to maximize its 
substantial earnings potential.59 When craigslist’s remaining 
founders learned that eBay was engaged in competition with it, 
they implemented measures designed to prevent eBay from 
gaining control of their company and changing its mission.60 
Holding that this action amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty, 
the court stated that, “[h]aving chosen a for-profit form, the 
craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards 
that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to 
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders.”61 As an observation of business reality, this is 
obvious and unremarkable—all corporations, including 
non-profits, must “promote the company’s value” in order to 
survive. But even this fact of life finds no mandate in the 
corporation statute, which, again, does not refer to businesses 
organized under it as “for-profit” entities. But the court then 
proceeded to make a much bolder claim, asserting that corporate 
policies—like craigslist’s—that seek not to maximize the economic 
value of a Delaware business corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders are invalid.62 In other words, according to this 
decision, not only does the statute—implicitly though not 
explicitly—mandate promotion of the company’s economic value, it 
also requires maximization. So, according to this court, someone 
who buys shares in an existing corporation with notice that the 
business does not seek to maximize profits can demand a change 
in that company’s mission.63 That could only be because the 
                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 11. 
 59. Id. at 9–17. 
 60. Id. at 21–24. 
 61. Id. at 34. 
 62. See id. at 35 (“Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot 
deploy a rights plan to defend a business strategy that openly eschews 
stockholder wealth maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ 
 fiduciary duties under Delaware law.”). 
 63. The key fact that eBay invested in craigslist knowing that the company 
did not seek to maximize profits and instead sought to provide a community 
service distinguishes that case from cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 
668 (Mich. 1919). In that famous case, the court rejected Henry Ford's efforts to 
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Delaware corporation law does not allow private individuals to 
choose voluntarily to organize a business for any purpose other 
than profit maximization.64 As noted, the statute itself says no 
such thing and in fact authorizes incorporation “to conduct or 
promote any lawful business or purposes.”65 As authority for a 
shareholder primacy conception of corporate purpose, this decision 
simply asserts its conclusion apodictically. No reasons are given 
why people like the craigslist founders should be disabled from 
tempering profit-seeking with social considerations, particularly 
when the complaining minority shareholder invested in the 
corporation with full knowledge of its community service mission. 
The very few other cases cited in support of the shareholder 
primacy proposition offer even weaker support for it. There is, of 
course Dodge v. Ford,66 in which the Michigan Supreme Court 
stated, without citation of authority, that 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the shareholders. The powers of the directors are to 
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be 
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not 
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, 
or the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes.67 
That decision, beloved as it may be by many corporate law 
academics, has only been cited three times by Delaware courts and 
never for its celebrated declaration on corporate purpose. 
As noted above, in the well-known Revlon decision,68 the 
Delaware Supreme Court does define management’s duty in terms 
                                                                                                     
reorient the company’s mission away from profit maximization for the sake of 
workers and consumers. The minority shareholders, however, had invested in the 
company with a reasonable expectation that the Ford Motor Co. would be run 
primarily in the financial interest of its shareholders. There was a legitimate 
gripe, therefore, that Ford had used his powers of control to “change the rules” in 
the middle of the game. In that sense, Dodge v. Ford can be described as a 
minority shareholder oppression case, see generally Smith, The Shareholder 
Primacy Norm, supra note 37, but the craigslist case cannot. 
 64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–15 (2011). 
 65. Id. § 101(b). 
 66. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 67. Id. at 683. 
 68. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1985). 
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of maximizing the short-term price of the corporation's shares.69 
Importantly, though, the decision addresses only the hostile 
takeover context and applies only when a corporation's board 
approves a transaction that will cause either a change of control or 
the break-up of the company.70 By implication, then, beyond those 
two circumstances there is no such duty. The Delaware Supreme 
Court had already said as much with regard to takeover defenses, 
expressly authorizing consideration of nonshareholder interests in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.71 and, in Time/Warner, 
endorsing the authority of corporate management to determine the 
corporation's future despite conflicting shareholder preferences.72 
And, in addition to the expressly narrow reach of Revlon is the 
important fact that either of the circumstances in which its 
mandate does apply can occur only when a corporation's board 
chooses voluntarily to enter into one or the other type of 
transaction.73 
As far as the case law allegedly supporting shareholder 
primacy is concerned, that’s about it.74 One could go further and 
                                                                                                     
 69. See id. at 182 (“The duty of the board had thus changed from the 
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s 
value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”). 
 70. See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994) 
(“It is the significance of [a change of control or a break-up of a company] that 
justifies: (a) focusing on the directors’ obligation to seek the best value reasonably 
available to the stockholders; and (b) requiring close scrutiny of board action 
which could be contrary to the stockholders’ interests.”). 
 71. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that a board can consider 
constituencies besides shareholders). 
 72. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 
(Del. 1989) (explaining that a board can consider “long-term” values and “is not 
under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term”). 
 73. Because it requires immediate share price maximization, it is hard to see 
how this decision could support the argument that Delaware law requires 
long-term maximization of firm value. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., The 
Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and 
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015) [hereinafter Strine, The Dangers of Denial].  
 74. A Delaware trial court opinion states in passing that “[i]t is the obligation 
of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the 
corporation’s stockholders.” Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 
1986). However, that case dealt with the legal rights of corporate bondholders and 
therefore did not address the question of the claims of shareholders versus those 
of other corporate constituencies. Even taken at face value, the statement rejects 
the idea that shareholders are entitled to short-term share price maximization. 
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point to features of corporate law that seem to indicate lack of 
commitment to shareholder primacy. Fiduciary duty law’s 
business judgment rule accords directors very broad discretion to 
run the company as they think best. As long as the claim is at least 
superficially plausible, directors can justify a range of policies—
including policies that seem to favor nonshareholders at the 
expense of shareholders—by reference to long-run benefit to the 
corporation. Only serious cases of self-dealing or near total neglect 
of responsibility can lead to accountability, and 
statutorily-authorized75 exculpation provisions included in most 
corporate charters eliminate monetary liability for breach of the 
duty of care. Further, while corporate law gives rights to 
shareholders—including voting rights, the right to bring 
derivative suits, and rights of access to corporate information—
that are not available to other constituent groups, in practice these 
rights are very weak mechanisms for imposing discipline on 
corporate management. As Professor Bainbridge has written, 
“[s]hareholder control rights are so weak that they scarcely qualify 
as part of corporate governance.”76 
As noted above, over forty states have enacted so-called 
constituency statutes.77 Using various linguistic formulations, 
these statutes expressly authorize corporate management to take 
nonshareholder interests into consideration even at the expense of 
shareholder wealth.78 To that extent these statutes are an express 
repudiation of shareholder primacy. Delaware does not have one, 
but one might say that if the statute and case law are already 
agnostic on the question of corporate purpose and the law already 
accords very broad discretion to corporate management, no such 
                                                                                                     
 75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). 
 76. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy]. 
 77. Sources cited supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 78. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (2017) (“[T]he board of 
directors, in considering the best interests of the corporation, may consider in 
addition to the interests of the corporation’s shareholders . . . corporation’s 
employees, suppliers, creditors and customers . . . [c]ommunity and societal 
considerations . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2017) 
(allowing a director to consider “the effects that the corporation’s actions may 
have in the short-term or in the long-term upon” nonshareholder constituencies 
such as “employees” and “customers and creditors”). 
LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD 717 
statute would be necessary. In the one area where the shareholder 
primacy idea was most urgent, the Delaware Supreme Court 
granted broad discretion to corporate management to defend 
against hostile takeovers in the interests both of nonshareholder 
constituencies and long-run strategic planning,79 at least as long 
as there were some “rationally related benefits” for shareholders.80 
That restriction is too vague to provide a vehicle for judicial review 
of management decisions. Judicial decisions, in other words, may 
have obviated the need for legislative action in Delaware. 
Having said all this, it remains a fact that a number of 
scholars deeply versed in Delaware corporate law are convinced 
that shareholder primacy is indeed a legal mandate.81 This deep 
disagreement about a foundational question has always struck me 
as a very puzzling feature of the corporate law landscape. I 
suggested in a recent Article that part of the reason for this could 
be the ambiguous meaning of the shareholder primacy term.82 In 
that Article, I used the term “radical shareholder primacy” to refer 
to the notion that corporate management is the agent of the 
shareholders, charged with maximizing their wealth.83 Viewed 
from an agency perspective, the primary challenge for corporate 
law is to render management accountable to the shareholders. 
Some scholars therefore argue that law reform is needed in order 
to empower shareholders and thereby reduce agency costs.84 
Others are more inclined to view current arrangements as optimal 
because of the widespread adoption of the corporate form despite 
                                                                                                     
 79. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) 
(discussing when Unocal duties attach); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that whether a defensive measure is reasonable 
can include the impact on “‘constituencies’ other than shareholders”). 
 80. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 
(Del. 1985). 
 81. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing 
Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008); Henry Hansman & Reinier Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to 
the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013); supra note 
76; infra note 84 
 82. Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 37, at 1016–17. 
 83. Id. at 1018–19. 
 84. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
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the “separation between ownership and control” characteristic of 
public corporations.85 They are likely to point to market-based 
mechanisms that enhance accountability, perhaps limiting calls 
for law reform to new rules that would stimulate a more active 
hostile takeover market.86 Scholars in the radical shareholder 
primacy camp, despite their disagreements over specific law 
reform proposals, nevertheless share the assumption that 
corporate management is the agent of the shareholders. 
The agency conception of shareholder primacy originated in 
the late 1970s, when economically oriented legal scholars turned 
to cutting edge scholarship produced by financial economists. 
Economists wrote of a principal-agent relationship but did not 
seem to have had the legal idea of agency in mind and seemed 
instead to have been thinking generally about situations in which 
one person acts for another. The legal conception of an agency 
relation implies more than that, including the principal’s power of 
control over the agent and fiduciary obligation running from the 
agent to the principal. Legal scholars took the economists’ looser 
notion of agency and imported it into corporate law by 
characterizing the relationship between management and the 
shareholders in terms of agency law.87 This implied a right of 
control and a fiduciary obligation running from management 
directly to the shareholders (rather than to the corporate entity). 
Seen from this perspective, agency cost reduction became the 
central problem of corporate law.88 
Critics of shareholder primacy are correct in their view that 
this extreme version of shareholder primacy is not the law. There 
is no legal basis for the agency idea in this context because the 
relationship between the board of directors and senior officers on 
the one hand and the shareholders on the other does not conform 
to the definition of an agency relation.89 While agency law insists 
                                                                                                     
 85.  Hansman & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 440. 
 86. See generally Rock, supra note 81, at 1923–25. 
 87. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the 
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1428–30 (1985) (discussing the 
agency argument) 
 88. See id. at 1428–30 (outlining the limits of an agency approach). 
 89. See id. at 1428–30 (describing the various ways that these two 
relationships are different). 
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on the principal’s right of control over the agent,90 corporate law 
expressly provides that the board of directors, not the 
shareholders, manages the corporation.91 Shareholders possess no 
legal mechanism for telling the board what to do. At best, they can 
exercise their voting rights to replace a board if they disapprove of 
its exercise of control but they cannot dictate how that power 
should actually be exercised. Further, in the modern publicly held 
corporation, shareholders typically lack the knowledge and 
expertise to exercise control over management, and most have no 
desire to do so. Efforts to control the board would in any event be 
subject to collective action costs, including the accommodation of 
heterogeneous preferences. 
There is, however, a more limited sense in which shareholders 
do enjoy primacy, though only with respect to their place within 
the legal framework of corporate governance. Shareholders alone 
among the corporation’s various constituencies enjoy voting rights 
with respect to election of directors and approval of fundamental 
changes, rights of access to corporate books and records and the 
list of shareholders, and the right to bring derivative suits. This 
model I refer to as “traditional shareholder primacy.” 
Disagreement over whether shareholder primacy is the law 
today is due at least in part to these two different meanings of the 
term. Those who insist that shareholder primacy is the law are 
correct, but in a limited sense. Traditional shareholder primacy is 
the law today, but it doesn't amount to much, and says nothing 
expressly about a shareholder wealth maximization mandate. 
Meanwhile, those who deny that shareholder primacy is the law 
are correct to the extent that corporate law does not embrace the 
agency model. They need, however, to acknowledge that 
long-standing features of current corporate law do lend themselves 
to a shareholder primacy characterization. But, there is no need to 
                                                                                                     
 90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining 
agency); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (defining 
agency); ROBERT C. CLARK, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56–59 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser eds., 1985); see also Brudney, supra note 87, at 1428–30 (outlining 
the limits of an agency approach). 
 91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); see also Paramount Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149–51 (Del. 1989) (“Delaware law confers the 
management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected board 
representatives.”). 
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resist seeing corporate law as reflecting the traditional 
shareholder primacy model because traditional shareholder 
primacy does not demand shareholder wealth maximization. 
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, in his 
paper for this Symposium,92 argues that the Delaware statute’s 
conferral of governance rights upon shareholders indicates an 
implicit requirement that corporations prioritize shareholder 
interests over those of other stakeholders, who lack such rights. 
History explains why this argument doesn’t work. Toward the 
middle of the nineteenth century, when corporations began to 
replace partnerships for organization of businesses, these firms 
were closely held entities analogous to general partnerships.93 It 
therefore was natural that shareholders but not nonshareholders 
(except by delegation from shareholders) should enjoy governance 
powers, just as partnership law conferred exclusive governance 
powers on general partners.94 And, analogously to partnership law, 
for much of the nineteenth century corporate law presumed one 
vote per shareholder rather than one vote per share, unless 
provided otherwise by the corporate charter or by statute.95 
Just as partnership law left it to the partners to decide what 
purposes the firm should pursue, corporate law accorded the same 
power to shareholders.96 Before the advent of general incorporation 
statutes beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century, 
formation of a corporation required a special act of the 
legislature.97 The incorporators defined the purposes that the firm 
was to pursue and were free to decide the extent to which profit 
maximization was to be the primary objective; no generally 
applicable statute or common law doctrine restricted this power. 
When incorporation pursuant to general statutes replaced special 
                                                                                                     
 92. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An 
Encouragement for Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV 1163 (2017). 
 93. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, supra note 37, at 291. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights 
from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 
1354–55 (2006) (explaining how this democratic system was extremely common 
in American and English law). 
 96. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, supra note 37, at 297.  
 97. See id. at 295 (describing early chartering requirements). 
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chartering, corporations were still small in scale and their stock 
closely held; large publicly held entities did not begin to achieve 
dominance until the last decades of the nineteenth century.98 Early 
general incorporation statutes—like their modern successors—did 
not mandate profit maximization. Delaware’s first general 
incorporation law, enacted in 1875, authorized incorporation for 
“charitable” as well as other specified purposes, including 
religious, literary, and manufacturing purposes.99 Just as they 
were able to do under the special chartering regime, it seems to 
have been assumed that incorporators ought to have the freedom 
to define corporate purpose according to their own preferences. 
This made sense in a world of closely held firms because, as a 
practical matter, the shareholders—or at least a majority of 
them—had the ability to decide such questions for themselves. 
Rather than implying a particular conception of corporate purpose, 
the shareholders’ governance monopoly seems instead to have 
obviated any need for statutory specification. If the shareholders 
wanted to maximize profits, they could commit the firm to that 
objective through the exercise of their powers of control. But this 
legal regime also gave them discretion to manage the firm so as to 
pursue other objectives. 
The nineteenth-century statutory framework—shareholder 
governance monopoly without a shareholder primacy mandate—
has survived essentially intact. Once large, publicly traded entities 
became commonplace after the turn of the twentieth century, 
shareholder governance powers lost much of their practical 
efficacy. This was the result of “the separation between ownership 
and control.”100 At this point, a statutory requirement of 
                                                                                                     
 98. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 285–89 (1977). 
 99. Act of Jan. 28, 1875, ch. 119, § 1, 15 Del. Laws 3. This statute was 
replaced by a thoroughly revised statute in 1883. Act of March 14, 1883, ch. 147, 
17 Del. Laws 212. The 1883 statute, like its modern successors, defined powers 
that corporations might exercise but included no provisions as to the purposes 
that corporations might lawfully pursue. In 1899 a new statute—modeled on New 
Jersey’s—replaced the earlier one. Act of March 9, 1899, ch. 273, 21 Del. Laws 
445. This statute authorized formation of corporations “for the transaction of any 
lawful business, or to promote or conduct any legitimate object or purpose” but, 
like its predecessors, said nothing about profit maximization.” Id. § 1. For a 
history of the Delaware statutes, see generally S. Samuel Arsht, A History of the 
Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1976). 
 100. See generally ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GARDNER MEANS, THE MODERN 
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shareholder primacy might have seemed desirable if that were the 
policy objective, because the shareholders no longer had the 
practical ability to determine questions of corporate purpose. The 
Delaware legislature has chosen not to do this, instead retaining 
the long-standing statutory agnosticism. Perhaps the lawmakers 
prefer not to intrude upon managerial discretion, a value of 
foundational importance in Delaware law. Whatever the reason 
may be, the shareholders’ governance monopoly does not now 
imply a shareholder wealth maximization requirement because it 
never did. 
Despite the reading of Delaware law I’ve presented here, it 
remains a fact that a number of scholars deeply versed in Delaware 
corporate law—including Chief Justice Strine, a corporate law 
scholar of the highest rank—are convinced that shareholder 
primacy is indeed a legal mandate. Thus, when Chief Justice 
Strine writes that Delaware law requires that corporate directors 
“must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other 
interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of 
promoting stockholder welfare,”101 people who care about these 
questions must pay attention. 
This is a debate that is not going to be resolved by reference to 
statutory and case law. The interpretive arguments are familiar 
and neither side seems inclined to change its mind. Perhaps 
though, debating the legal authority for shareholder primacy 
misses the point. If the Delaware judges are convinced that 
shareholder primacy is the law, challenging the authority for that 
position is not going to gain traction and may even be beside the 
point. Statements in law review articles by Chief Justice Strine—
which otherwise might seem to be a problematic venue for 
resolving controversial legal questions102—then become useful 
                                                                                                     
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (explaining managerial autonomy 
due to wisely dispersed share ownership). 
 101. Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 73, at 768. Chief Justice 
Strine’s version of shareholder primacy would not require directors to maximize 
current share price. Rather it would require that they maximize the financial 
interests of shareholders in the long run. Id. at 766–67. 
 102. One might question whether it is appropriate for judges to attempt to 
clarify hotly debated questions of law by means of law review articles. Ordinarily, 
we look to legislatures to revise the law and to judges deciding actual cases to 
clarify its meaning. For judicial law-making, the adversarial process at work in a 
particular controversy with real stakes for the parties provides the occasion for 
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evidence of the judiciary’s understanding of the law, more useful 
than the statute and cases. 
The point here is akin to an older argument about the nature 
of law. For Sir William Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century 
English jurist, law consisted of customary principles resting upon 
“general reception and usage.”103 These principles were to be 
identified and explained by judges, “the depository of the laws; the 
living oracles.”104 Cases themselves were not law, only “evidence” 
of what the law is.105 According to this view, Chief Justice Strine 
and his colleagues on the bench—whose knowledge is shaped by 
experience and study and whose work is guided by their oath of 
office106—enjoy privileged access to the meaning of the law’s 
principles and it is their opinions about what the law is that count; 
arguments among mere academics about the implications of 
particular cases or statutes may actually be irrelevant.107  
Even if this is so, Chief Justice Strine’s definition of corporate 
purpose in terms of long-run profit maximization rather than of 
short-term share price108 may go a long way toward satisfying 
critics of shareholder primacy. Coupled with the business 
judgment rule’s broad deference to good faith managerial 
decisionmaking, the practical effect may be to allow management 
to sacrifice profits for the sake of competing considerations in many 
cases. Courts are unlikely to second-guess facially plausible claims 
of long-run financial benefit, for example, in the form of 
                                                                                                     
reasoned argument and debate between contrasting positions. The judicial 
process at the appellate level requires collegial collaboration and the give and 
take that that can require, especially important in Delaware where there is a 
strong tradition of unanimity in the Supreme Court. And the requirement of 
publication ensures that opinions in controversial cases draw public scrutiny that 
judges generally are unable to ignore however hard they might try. In contrast, a 
law review article written by an author who identifies himself by reference to his 
judicial office inevitably carries significant authority despite the unofficial venue 
and despite the absence of institutional mechanisms that constrain and shape 
judicial opinions. 
 103. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68. 
 104. Id. at *69. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
 107. In this regard, note Chief Justice Strine’s reference to “accomplished 
[Delaware] jurists” like Chancellor William Allen, Chancellor William Chandler, 
and Justice Andrew Moore. Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 73, at 776. 
 108. Id. 
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reputational gains to be realized from being a “good corporate 
citizen.” 
B. Voluntary CSR 
Given the law’s flexibility as a practical matter (and perhaps 
doctrinally as well), it seems evident that corporate management 
possesses broad discretion to pursue socially valuable objectives, 
even if such pursuits come at the expense of the shareholders. Of 
course, corporations must make money to survive, but that fact of 
life still leaves management with substantial space within which 
to promote social welfare in appropriate cases, including, for 
example, employee well-being, the human rights of those affected 
by corporate activities, and environmental concerns. 
I would prefer to see law reform both external and internal to 
corporate law that would address the relations between 
corporations and society more directly. Leaving it up to corporate 
management to make these choices in a world of conflicting 
pressures, extra-legal norms that encourage devotion to 
shareholders, and varying levels of commitment to social welfare 
values is a decidedly second-best solution. But, since meaningful 
law reform in this context seems to be something of a pipedream, 
and as long as corporations continue to generate social costs—or at 
least ignore them despite their ability to do much better—it seems 
to me appropriate to think about whether corporations might use 
their legal freedom to act in a socially responsible manner even in 
the absence of legal mandate. 
In thinking about the prospects for voluntary CSR, I find it 
helpful to identify two different conceptions or models of CSR. I 
have referred to these as the “ethical” and “strategic” models of 
CSR.109 The likelihood of voluntary adoption of CSR business 
policies may differ depending on which model one has in mind, 
                                                                                                     
 109. David Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Sustainability, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 35, 41–46, 65–71 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 
2015) [hereinafter Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Sustainability]. In an earlier article, I used the terms “constituency” and 
“sustainability” to refer to the “ethical” and “strategic” models. David Millon, Two 
Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 523–525 
(2011). 
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although it turns out that there are strong disincentives to 
acceptance of both versions.110 
“Ethical” CSR posits that management owes a duty to respect 
the welfare of all the corporation’s stakeholders.111 In addition to 
shareholders, these include workers, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, and those affected by the corporation’s impact on the 
environment.112 Management’s duty is to take the interests of one 
or more of these nonshareholder constituencies into account when 
it is appropriate to do so, even if that comes at the expense of the 
shareholders.113 This can mean avoiding conduct that, while within 
legal bounds, is harmful to some stakeholder groups, such as 
profitable business activity that is harmful to the environment.114 
Corporations may also, for example, act affirmatively to alleviate 
suffering in a developing country in which they do business. 
Ethical CSR does not specify when and how such trade-off 
decisions are to be made. Scholars primarily in the field of business 
ethics have developed normative theories to guide 
decisionmakers,115 but the vast range of circumstances in which 
these questions can arise and the complexity of the relevant ethical 
considerations make generalizable, rule-like prescriptions 
impossible. 
To this it is commonly objected that according management 
such broad power without meaningful guidance as to how that 
power should be exercised is a recipe for unaccountable discretion 
that may end up benefiting no one but the managers themselves. 
While there may be truth to this complaint, it does not seem to me 
that the antidote is to mandate shareholder wealth maximization 
                                                                                                     
 110. Infra Part III.C. 
 111. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 64. 
 112. Id. at 62. 
 113. Id. at 60–63. 
 114. See id. at 62 (“For example, management may decide to install expensive 
new equipment to decrease air pollution even though it is not legally required to 
do so. The public stands to benefit, but the added expense will reduce 
shareholders’ profits, at least in the near term.”). 
 115.  See SUZANNE BENN & DIANE BOLTON, KEY CONCEPTS IN CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 13–17 (2011) (describing various ethical constructs, 
including ethical egoism, virtue ethics, deontological ethics, consequentialist 
ethics, rights-based ethics, justice-based ethics, cultural relativism, and 
postmodern ethics, as relevant frameworks within which to discuss CSR). 
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without regard for the resulting social costs that may be inflicted 
on nonshareholders. 
“Strategic” CSR is based on the idea that, under certain 
circumstances, business decisions that benefit nonshareholder 
constituencies can enhance shareholder wealth in the long run.116 
The justification therefore is instrumental, in the sense that 
policies benefiting nonshareholders are undertaken to further the 
financial interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather 
than out of a sense of ethical obligation. This has been referred to 
as the “business case” for CSR.117 
There are plenty of real world examples of companies that 
have invested in the well-being of workers, suppliers, and others 
affected by their activities, resulting in enhanced productivity and 
output.118 In a similar vein, numerous companies have used 
process and product design innovation to reduce costs while also 
contributing to environmental sustainability.119 Importantly, a 
recent, well-designed empirical study provides impressive 
evidence of the potential financial benefits and competitive 
advantages to be realized from voluntary adoption of socially and 
environmentally responsible business policies.120 
                                                                                                     
 116. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 65. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See generally Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared 
Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and 
Growth, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea-
creating-shared-value (last visisted Mar. 11, 2017) (explaining how numerous 
companies, such as General Electric, Google, IBM, Intel, Johnson & Johnson, and 
others have been following the “principle of shared value, which involves creating 
economic value in a way that also creates value for society by addressing its needs 
and challenges”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael E. 
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive 
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2006), 
https://hbr.org/2006/12/strategy-and-society-the-link-between-competitive-
advantage-and-corporate-social-responsibility (last visited May 2, 2017) 
(describing the CSR activities of General Electric, Toyota, and other companies) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 119. See Ram Nidumolu, C.K. Prahalad & M.R. Rangaswarmi, Why 
Sustainability is Now the Key Driver of Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2009), 
https://hbr.org/2009/09/why-sustainability-is-now-the-key-driver-of-innovation 
(last visited May 2, 2017) (describing how the pressure to develop sustainable 
business systems has driven innovation that results in cost-saving) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 120. See generally Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The 
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C. Obstacles to Voluntary CSR 
Despite evidence of the potential financial benefits of strategic 
CSR and although corporate management enjoys broad discretion 
within the law’s loose limits to pursue CSR policies, a number of 
extra-legal factors operate to discourage voluntary adoption of 
strategic as well as ethical CSR policies. The culture of business—
expressed in widely held assumptions as well as social norms—
tends to discourage decisions that are not designed to maximize 
current shareholder value.121 Business leaders typically assume 
that that is their primary responsibility.122 Reinforcing this 
assumption is the prevalence of equity-based executive 
compensation in the form of stock grants and options. These 
incentives reward enhanced share prices achieved through strong 
short-term earnings, while failure to meet earnings targets can 
cost CEOs their jobs.123 Beyond the board room and executive 
suite, prominent graduate schools of business promote a 
shareholder primacy vision of management’s responsibility.124 The 
business press likewise tends to take this idea for granted.125  
                                                                                                     
Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance, 
60 MGMT. SCI. 2835 (2014). 
 121.  Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 53, 55–56. 
 122. See generally ASPEN INSTITUTE, UNPACKING CORPORATE PURPOSE: A 
REPORT ON THE BELIEFS OF EXECUTIVES, INVESTORS AND SCHOLARS 11–13 (2014), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/Unpacking
_Corporate_Purpose_May_2014_0.pdf [hereinafter ASPEN INSTITUTE]; BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012, at 30 (2012), 
http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/BRT_Principles_of_ Corporate_ 
Governance_-2012_Formatted_Final.pdf. 
 123. See Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How has CEO Turnover 
Changed?, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 82–83 (2012) (describing how likelihood of a 
CEO’s termination has grown more tightly correlated to stock performance since 
2000). 
 124. ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 122, at 37; see also RAKESH KHURANA, FROM 
HIGHER AIMS TO HIGHER HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A 
PROFESSION 364 (2007) (“Inside business schools . . . faculties used principal–
agent theory to recast the role of management. Instead of being responsible to 
multiple stakeholders . . . , managers were now said to be responsible only to 
shareholders . . . .”). 
 125. See, e.g., Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social 
Responsibility, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052748703338004575230112664504890 (last visited Feb. 20, 
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An especially strong disincentive to voluntary adoption of CSR 
policies is pressure from institutional shareholders.126 This is 
particularly so in the case of large public and private pension 
funds. As a group, public funds own approximately eight percent 
of the U.S. stock market.127 The largest of these are huge. The 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), for 
example, has assets worth $290 billion and current obligations to 
over 600,000 retirees and contingent obligations to over 1.2 million 
members who are not yet retired.128 Public pension funds, and 
private ones too, necessarily have very long time horizons because 
of their obligations to future retirees, so they are often referred to 
as the ultimate long-term investors. Nevertheless, these 
institutions are also subject to huge obligations to current 
beneficiaries, who are entitled to a check each month.129 These 
institutions are therefore under strong pressure to maximize 
short-term returns on their portfolios, as are employer-sponsored 
defined benefit pension plans. 
Mutual funds also face pressures that encourage insistence on 
short-term returns.130 For most funds, fees are a function of total 
assets under management.131 In the competition for investor 
dollars, growth and similar styles of mutual fund emphasize 
current performance because year-to-year results strongly 
influence investors’ decisions to move money into or out of 
                                                                                                     
2017) (“The movement for better corporate governance . . . demands that 
managers fulfill their fiduciary duty to act in the shareholders’ interest.”). 
 126. See generally David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, Shareholder Social 
Responsibility]. 
 127. Id. at 913  
 128. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS., CALPERS FACTS AT A 
GLANCE 1–5 (June 30, 2015), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-
publications/facts-at-a-glance.pdf. Nearly two-thirds of CalPERS’ portfolio is 
invested in public and private equities.   
 129. See id. at 1 (showing that for CalPERS, the average monthly payment is 
$2,627). 
 130. See Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 126, at 934–
36. 
 131. Id. at 934. 
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particular funds.132 Publicly available year-end rankings seem to 
be especially important.133 
Pension funds and mutual funds that follow short-term 
investment strategies tend to favor companies focused on strong 
quarter-to-quarter accounting results.134 They exert pressure to 
meet earnings targets through exercise of voting rights, informal 
behind-the-scenes engagement, or the threat of large-scale sell-offs 
that will reduce share price. Managers of underperforming 
companies face pay cuts, lower bonuses, or even termination.135 
The implications for voluntary CSR are clear. All shareholders 
focused on financial return tend to be hostile toward ethical CSR, 
which spends money or foregoes investment to promote social 
values, despite the negative impact on shareholder wealth.136 
Importantly, shareholders focused on short-term results also 
present an obstacle to strategically deployed CSR.137 This is so 
even though strategic CSR justifies investment in nonshareholder 
well-being by reference to corporations’ financial self-interest.138 
The problem here is one of time.139 Investments in nonshareholder 
well-being will typically involve current expense that reduces 
current earnings and therefore, in today’s investment 
environment, threatens share price.140 Even if in the long-run the 
financial pay-offs can more than make up for the short-term cost, 
shareholders under pressure to generate short-term gains will be 
unwilling to wait.141 Companies concerned about current earnings 
                                                                                                     
 132. Id.  
 133. Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of 
Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85, 87–88 (1996). 
 134. See Brian Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings 
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 136. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 43. 
 137. Id. at 71. 
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 140. See id. at 65–66. 
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and share price will therefore be reluctant to make investments 
that only generate returns years down the road.142 This is why even 
strategically motivated CSR can meet with opposition. 
In short, careful thinking about shareholder primacy and its 
implications for CSR leads to some disappointing conclusions. 
With respect to the law on the shareholder primacy question, even 
though the legal authority for a shareholder primacy mandate is 
questionable and controversial, it may not matter if those in 
positions of authority—the Delaware judiciary—are convinced 
that it is the law. Further, even distinguishing strategic from 
ethical CSR, in the hope that at least the former version might 
have some viability, is problematic because of pressures from 
powerful institutional shareholders who prefer strong current 
share prices to long-term gains. 
IV. What Difference Have We Made? 
After thirty years of writing about corporate law, one can’t 
help but wonder what difference it might have made. Early in my 
academic career, a colleague at another law school said that a 
scholar’s goal should be to change the way people think about his 
or her field. He didn’t mean persuading everyone to see things the 
same way. What he meant was a reorientation of the scholarly 
conversation: new notions of what’s important and what the 
relevant questions should be. Changing the terms of the debate. 
In some respects, academic corporate law hasn’t changed a 
great deal over the past thirty years. Many prominent scholars 
assume that shareholder wealth maximization is the relevant 
benchmark.143 For them, the key questions continue to revolve 
around the balance of power between shareholders and 
management. Some argue that managerial discretion best serves 
                                                                                                     
motivates mutual fund managers to meet or beat performance 
benchmarks. . . . [a]nd [prioritize] short-term returns.”). 
 142. See id. at 58 (“Even if long-term economic benefits are achievable, the 
immediate negative impact on earnings and potentially on share prices may 
discourage management from moving forward.”). 
 143. Id. at 59. 
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that objective144 while others insist that empowerment of 
shareholders will improve managerial performance.145  
Even so, it strikes me as undeniable that the landscape has 
changed in important ways. There is today a serious debate over 
whether shareholder primacy is a legal mandate as well as a 
desirable policy goal. While the idea of CSR seems not to enjoy the 
traction in the United States that it does in the United Kingdom 
and Western Europe,146 a number of scholars are exploring 
conceptions of corporate purpose and management responsibility 
that go beyond one-dimensional conceptions of shareholder 
primacy.147 There is now a serious conversation about shareholder 
primacy that wasn’t happening when Professor Johnson and I 
started to work together way back in the late 1980s. Shareholder 
primacy now appears—normatively and as a matter of positive 
law—to be a question for debate and argument rather than an 
assumed truth.  
We don’t claim credit (or blame!) for these developments. 
Nevertheless, we do think we might have played a role. As we 
embarked on our scholarly collaboration, we soon found ourselves 
part of a small number of corporate law pioneers—sometimes 
labeled “progressives” or “communitarians” though not all would 
accept either label—who were willing to take positions that were 
definitely out of the mainstream, even though we risked 
marginalization within the corporate law academy. The conference 
we organized at Washington and Lee in 1993—called “New 
Directions in Corporate Law”—was designed to energize scholars, 
especially junior ones, who were dissatisfied with the mainstream 
orthodoxy and were looking for a supportive group of like-minded 
academics willing to think seriously about alternatives. Perhaps 
our writing encouraged others inclined to challenge mainstream 
                                                                                                     
 144. Professor Bainbridge is the most prominent proponent of this view. See 
generally Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 76.  
 145. Professor Bebchuk is the best known partisan for a robust shareholder 
empowerment agenda. See generally Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, supra note 84. 
 146. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 47–65. 
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orthodoxy to do so as well. Maybe swimming against the tide is a 
little easier if one has companions. 
Regardless of how influential we might have been in 
stimulating new questions and establishing new priorities, we are 
both proud of having been part of a movement that sought to move 
beyond shareholder primacy toward new conceptions of corporate 
purpose and management responsibility. And we’re happy that our 
law school’s name has been attached to that movement.148 But the 
important thing for us is that the discourse has changed in ways 
that we think are extremely important. While many scholars 
continue to embrace a shareholder primacy orientation, there are 
now credible, broadly shared alternatives. That is not going to 
change any time soon. For us that has been an immensely 
gratifying development. And, in optimistic moments, we imagine 
that the momentum may even be trending in our direction, 
although that question—assuming it can even be answered—
might best be left for another day. 
Beyond the academy, it is harder to be confident that there is 
significant movement away from shareholder primacy as the 
normal conception of corporate purpose and management 
responsibility. There have been encouraging developments. There 
are plenty of anecdotes about companies realizing that treating 
employees well can generate financial pay-offs. And there is a 
growing body of empirical research showing that socially 
responsible companies can outperform rivals fixated on the 
bottom line.149 Even so, there is a broadly held cultural 
assumption that the ultimate focus of corporate activity ought 
to be shareholder wealth maximization. As noted above, 
business leaders generally embrace this idea, which is taught in 
                                                                                                     
 148. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A 
Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 
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 149. See generally Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Sustainability, supra 
note 120. 
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leading business schools, and the business press seems largely 
to take it for granted.150 
Standard descriptions of the management-shareholder 
relationship reflect and reinforce shareholder primacy values. 
Shareholders are typically referred to as the “owners” of the 
corporation. This is a mistake; they own the corporation’s stock 
and enjoy the rights that go with that property interest, but 
neither they nor anyone else “owns” the corporate entity. 
Nevertheless, the ownership idea obviously implies that the 
stewards of the shareholders’ property—corporate 
management—ought to manage it in the owners’ interest, just 
as, for example, the manager of a rental property ought to 
operate it primarily with the landlord’s financial interests in 
mind. The mistaken agency description of the relationship 
between shareholders and management151 seems also to have 
infiltrated public discourse about corporate law. This too implies 
a strong normative slant, namely that management should act 
on behalf of and in the interests of the shareholders according 
to normal legal conceptions of the principal–agent 
relationship.152 
Not only is shareholder value widely assumed to be the 
appropriate benchmark for assessing corporate performance; 
shareholder value is today typically thought of in terms of 
maximizing current stock market prices through strong 
quarterly accounting results.153 This is the widely noted 
“short-termism” phenomenon, which discourages even 
profitable long-term investment necessary for the corporation ’s 
sustainability because of its immediate impact on profits and 
share price.154 Widely used equity-based executive compensation 
                                                                                                     
 150. Supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text. 
 151. Supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 152. For discussions of various metaphors for the management-shareholder 
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Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2 STAN. AGORA:  ONLINE J. 
LEGAL PERSP., Winter 2001, at 39; David Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body, 
2 GRAVEN IMAGES:  J. CULTURE, L. & SACRED 116 (1995); David Millon, Theories of 
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). 
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 154. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate 
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arrangements give management a personal stake in maximizing 
current share prices, the point being to align managerial 
incentives with the shareholders’ interest in share price.155 And, 
as noted above,156 management is also subject to external 
pressures from institutional shareholders who are themselves 
facing strong incentives to focus on current share prices. 
One might have thought that first the accounting scandals of 
2001, involving Enron and other companies,157 and then the 
financial crisis of 2008158 would have prompted a broad rethinking 
of shareholder primacy. Both situations involved efforts to boost 
profits and share prices, by fraud in the first case,159 and by 
excessive, reckless risk-taking in the second.160 The social costs 
were obvious in both cases.161 
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Yet there has been no general reevaluation of a shareholder 
primacy conception of corporate purpose, such as occurred during 
the hostile takeover era. Then, business leaders were effective 
advocates for reform. The interests of corporate management 
aligned with those of workers and other nonshareholders because 
both stood to lose from a wide-open market for corporate control.162 
In contrast, the more recent crises saw management as the villain, 
either as crooks or as incompetents who did not fully understand 
the risks their companies were assuming. Had corporate leaders 
criticized shareholder primacy and called for reform, they would 
have lacked credibility. 
There may be an institutional story as well. The Delaware 
judiciary took the lead in adjusting the law governing hostile 
takeovers to serve the conflicting interests of managers, 
shareholders, and nonshareholders.163 The judges were required to 
decide the cases that came before them and therefore had no choice 
but to confront the significant public policy questions presented by 
the litigants.164 And they could do so without being subject to the 
political, interest-driven pressures that legislators face.165 
In contrast, in the wake of the 2001 and 2008 crises, judges 
generally were not called upon to decide foundational questions of 
corporate purpose. Instead it fell to the United States Congress to 
address demands for reform. First in Sarbanes–Oxley166 and then 
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 162. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate 
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 163. Supra notes 23 and 31.  
 164. See Johnson, Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and 
Corporate Law, supra note 36, at 887 (“Given the legislative public-law vacuum, 
the takeover dilemma falls squarely into the laps of the Delaware 
Judiciary. Unlike legislators, judges cannot evade the knotty questions associated 
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736 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699 (2017) 
in Dodd–Frank,167 we ended up with a grab bag of provisions that 
aimed generally at empowering shareholders or that mandated 
new regulations purportedly for their benefit—even though it was 
obvious in both cases that shareholders’ appetite for profits 
motivated the misconduct.168 Here federal legislators seem to have 
been captive to a myopic, binary vision of corporate law, which is 
incapable of conceiving of corporate law reform other than in pro-
shareholder terms.169 More far-reaching reform is not even 
considered. 
While the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby170 decision did reject 
the view that business corporations are legally required to pursue 
profit at the expense of competing values,171 that decision seems 
unlikely to prompt broad acceptance of that interpretation of the 
law. The Court’s interpretation of state corporate law on the 
question of corporate purpose is not binding on state courts 
deciding questions of state corporate law.172 Further, the majority 
opinion, although correct in its conclusion, is not as clear as one 
might have preferred. And the political context—exemption from 
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 171. See id. at 2771 (“[M]odern corporate law does not require for-profit 
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discussion, see generally Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 
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 172. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 51, 
at 24 (“But the Court’s views on corporate purpose would not be binding in the 
context of a state law dispute on the issue of permitted (or mandated) corporate 
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Obamacare’s contraception mandate on religious grounds—has 
tainted the majority opinion in the eyes of progressive scholars who 
might otherwise be willing to embrace its views on corporate 
purpose. 
So, for now at least, there does not seem to be strong, 
coordinated, and effective pressure for rejection of shareholder 
primacy outside of the legal academy. The Delaware judiciary and 
many business leaders take for granted that shareholder primacy 
is the law.173 Social norms and extra-legal pressures also 
discourage socially responsible management.174 While we and our 
colleagues at other law schools may have succeeded in encouraging 
debate and new ways of thinking about foundational questions, we 
are left with the disappointing truth that so far we seem to have 
had limited impact beyond our academic world. 
V. Conclusion 
Over the past thirty years, a constant theme runs through 
most of my co-authored and solo corporate law writing. That is 
concern about the social costs of a shareholder primacy conception 
of corporate purpose and managerial responsibility. Early on, 
Professor Johnson and I focused on the hostile takeover context 
because the conflict between shareholder and nonshareholder 
interests was so starkly presented. More recently, I have written 
about corporate social responsibility from several angles, focusing 
on legal as well as extra-legal impediments to widespread 
voluntary adoption of policies designed to address the social costs 
of corporate activity.175 Meanwhile, Professor Johnson has 
continued to write about corporate purpose, corporate officers, and 
the relationship between religion and corporate law.176 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettled in Delaware Corporate Law: Business 
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 434 (2013) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Unsettled in Delaware Corporate Law] (exploring the 
origins of erroneous beliefs in shareholder primacy as established law and 
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It seems undeniable that the scholarly landscape has changed 
dramatically since we started our collaborative work. There is now 
serious and robust debate about whether shareholder primacy is 
the law and also whether it should be. We think this is a very 
positive development. Without claiming too much credit, we both 
think we played an important role in helping to bring about a 
major change in the focus of the scholarly conversation. I am less 
sanguine about developments beyond legal academy. Although the 
accounting scandals of 2001 and the financial crisis of 2008 should 
have prompted widespread debate about the social costs of chasing 
corporate profits, that does not seem to have occurred. Law reform 
efforts seem instead to have focused on protection for shareholders, 
as though corporate law exists in a binary world of management 
and investors, and law reform can only consist of efforts to tilt the 
balance of power in the direction of shareholders. The prospects for 
movement beyond that myopic worldview seem dim, even more so 
in the current political environment. 
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